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CONTROL OF MOBILITY OF LABOR IN THE SOVIET UNION
GEORGE M. ARMSTRONG, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Soviet ideologists maintain that governmental control over the re-
sources used in production is one of the primary advantages of a
planned economy, permitting rational allocation of productive capacity
to achieve national goals.' Indeed the government maintains control
over most of the resources utilized by state enterprises in the public
sector.' All land is owned by the government, as are all buildings and
fixed assets that are operated by state owned enterprises.3 The State
Bank regulates all loans made to enterprises for the purchase of goods4
and the Construction Bank extends all credit that is necessary for capi-
*Assistant Professor, New York Law School. Ph.D. Princeton University; J.D.
University of Pennsylvania. The author gratefully thanks Ms. Ina Mitrovich and Ms.
Vickie Groman of the library of Rutgers Law School, Camden, N.J. for their assistance.
1. See, e.g., V. GRIBANOV, KHOZASTVENNOE PRAvo 67 (1977). Gribanov states
that:
The principal distinction of the socialist form of production is
the action of the objective law of planning on the development
of the national economy, dictating the necessity and permit-
ting the possibility of planned development of social produc-
tion. Planning, emphasized V.I. Lenin, as an objective charac-
teristic of the socialist form of production, consists of the
constant and conscious adherence to proportionality. "Social-
ism is unthinkable," he said, "without planned state organiza-
tion, upheld by tens of millions of individuals strictly observ-
ing a single norm in the task of production and distribution of
goods."
Id.
2. A. Nov, THE Sovwr ECONoMY: AN INTRODUcMON 87-110 (2d ed. 1968). Nove
discusses the planning process and the system of supply of raw materials, investment
and construction, agricultural planning, planning of trade and governmental means for
determining whether enterprises perform their planned tasks.
3. THE CONST. (FUNDAMENTAL LAW) OF THE R.S.F.S.R. § 11.
4. Ustav Gosudarstvennogo Banks SSSR, 1960 SP SSSR No. 18, at. 160. "The
State Bank, on the basis of the plan of development of the national economy, organizes
and regulates capital formation in the nation, retains surplus monetary resources of
state, cooperative and social enterprises .... " Id. § 1. "The USSR State Bank, in the
process of supplying credit, organization and regulation of monetary transfers, assures
control through the Ruble of the course of performance of plans of production and turn-
over of goods. . . ." Id. § 2.
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tal improvements.' Gosplan,' the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(U.S.S.R.) Committee on Planning, and governmental ministries di-
rectly supervising producing firms determine which goods these enter-
prises will produce and, if the goods are to be sold to another socialist
enterprise, generally determine the buyer. Fuel and other sources of
energy are distributed to enterprises through the annual Plans of in-
dustrial ministries.'
The only significant resource used in production that is outside
the sphere of economic planning is labor power. Aside from "young
specialists," s graduates of Higher Education Institutions, over whom
the government retains some control for three years following gradua-
tion, workers in the Soviet Union retain a high degree of freedom to
change employment at will. Moreover, Soviet law provides the worker
with a meaningful, although not airtight, guarantee that his enterprise,
or the ministry which supervises it, will not reassign him to other em-
ployment without his consent.
This paper will discuss the rights of a worker under Soviet law to
change jobs, or to retire at will, and the authority of the enterprise or
government ministry to transfer him to other employment. In addition,
it will examine the methods that the government uses to influence
workers to retain their present employment or to accept a transfer, the
most significant of which is the loss by workers of financial benefits
accruing from uninterrupted employment. Finally, it will set forth the
benefits and disadvantages which Soviet commentators claim can re-
sult from the present system of relatively unhindered labor mobility
5. Ustav Vsesoiuznogo Banka Finansirovaniia Kapital'nykh Vlozhenii
(Stroibanka SSSR), 1964 SP SSSR No. 19, st. 122, § 2. "The basic task of the USSR
Construction Bank is fulfillment in accordance with the directives of the Party and gov-
ernment of supervision of the correct and effective use of capital investment .... " Id.
6. Gosplan is "the central organ of state administration in the area of planning."
0 Sovete Ministrov SSSR, 1978 VEDOMOSTI V.RKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR No. 28, st. 436,
§ 9(2).
7. Obshchee Polozhenie o Ministerstvakh SSSR, 1967 SP SSSR No. 17, st. 116, §
31. For additional information, see Maggs, Soviet Corporation Law: The New Statute on
the Socialist State Production Enterprise, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 478 (1965); Speer, Con-
tract Rights and the Planned Economy: Peaceful Coexistence Under the 1969 Soviet
Statutes on Deliveries of Goods, 3 LAW & POL'v INT'L Bus. 510 (1971); Comment, Role of
State Arbitrazh Under the New Conditions of Economic Management in the Soviet
Union, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1285 (1968).
8. Polozhenie o Personal'nom Raspredelenii Molodykh Spetsialistov,
Okonchaiushchikh Vyshie i Srednie Zavedeniia SSSR, 1968 BIULLETEN' MINISTERSTVA
VYSHEGO I SREDNEGO SPSIAL'NOGO OBRAZOVANIIA SSSR No. 6, § 1; SBORNIK ZAKONO-




and the proposals for change in legislation that some of them have
advanced.'
I. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS AND WORKER MOBILITY
The Principles of Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and Union Repub-
lics on Labor,1" which are applicable to all employment contracts in the
country, provide for several types of contracts of varying duration. The
Principles of Labor Legislation state that:
Labor contracts are concluded:
1) For an undefined period;
2) For a defined period of not more than three
years;
3) For the period of performance of particular
work."
The term of the contract under which any given person is employed
depends upon the industry in which the employee works, the educa-
tional benefits that the government supplies to the worker in prepara-
tion for employment and the financial bonuses which are the perqui-
sites of the job.
A. Contracts for Undefined Periods
The standard employment contract for industrial labor appears to
be the contract for an undefined period. Pashkov, who writes exten-
sively in the field of labor law,'2 observes that legislation regulating the
length of employment contracts "is based on the principle of free
choice of the type of work and profession, taking account of the inter-
ests of society."' 8 One of the legislator's methods of protecting the in-
terests of workers, he writes, is "the principle of free expression of will
9. This paper sets out the legal framework regulating the mobility of Soviet la-
bor, emphasizing contractural restrictions and economic incentives. Two areas of labor
regulation that will not be considered are labor in prison camps and disciplinary-instruc-
tion labor. These subjects are significant, but they are outside the basic framework of
legislation with which the average worker is concerned.
10. OSNOV ZAKONODATEL'STVA SOIUZA SSR i SoxuzNvKH REsPuRLK 0 TRUDE
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Principles of Labor Legislation).
11. Id. § 10.
12. A.S. Pashkov's books in the field of labor law include: ZAKONODATEL'STVO 0
TRUDE (1972); OSNOVY SOVETSKoGo TRuDoGo PRAVA (1972); PRAVOVYE OSNovy NAUCHNOI
ORGAMZATSXI TRUDA (1967); SOVETSKos TRUDOVOz PRAvo (1966); PRAvovoE RRGU-
LIROVANIE PODGOTOVKI i RAsPREDELENA KADROV (1966); PRAVOVOa POLOZHENIE PROFES-
SIONAL'NYKH Soiuzov SSSR (1962); PRAVovm Fomiw OBBSPECHENIIA PROIZVODSTVA
KADRAMI v SSSR (1961).
13. A.S. PASHKOV, ZAKONODATR'STVO o TRun 174 (1972).
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in selection of the place and type of work."' 4 This principle "presup-
poses recognition of the worker's and professional's (sluzhashchii)
right to leave the job on his own initiative."'16 One Soviet scholar states
that 90% of all instances of employment termination occur at the be-
hest of the worker.'e
Soviet scholars claim that the labor contract for an undefined pe-
riod protects the worker's right to free choice of place and type of em-
ployment. Indeed, the worker may terminate such employment on two
weeks notice.' 7 Moreover, "the worker or professional is not restricted
to any type of motives in quitting on his own initiative."'" He may
exercise this right "without hindrance" from the director."
B. Contracts For Seasonal Work
Section 10 of the Principles of Labor Legislation also permits the
formation of employment contracts for the duration of a particular
job.'0 The primary importance of these contracts is in the agricultural
sector where collective farms may employ workers from outside the
farm for the growing or harvesting season. In 1974 the Supreme Soviet
of the U.S.S.R. issued regulations governing these contracts.2' These
regulations provide that a labor contract for seasonal work "may be
entered for a period of time not exceeding the length of a season. ' 22
Workers who are parties to seasonal contracts have the right to termi-
nate the employment agreement on three days notice.
2
3
C. Contracts For a Term Not Exceeding Three Years
The other variation of the labor contract for a particular period
permitted by the Principles of Labor Legislation includes the contract
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. S.A. IvANov, TRUDOVOz PRAvo i NAUCHNO-TEKHNICHESKiI PROGRESS 157
(1974).
17. Principles of Labor Legislation, supra note 10, § 16.
18. A.S. PASHKOV, supra note 13, at 214.
19. Id. at 175. It has been noted that: "The law does not require the worker to
state the reasons for resigning and does not link the resignation to any recognition by
management of the respectability of those reasons. The worker is entitled to cease work
at will without the agreement or permission of management." Iu. N. KORSHUNOV, R.Z.
Livswrrs & M.S. RYUI EVA, SOVMrSKOE ZAKONODATEL'STVO 0 TRUDE 57 (1980) [herein-
after cited as Iu. N. KORSHUNOV].
20. Principles of Labor Legislation, supra note 10, § 10.
21. Ukazanie Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1974 BRJLLW rN'
VMUaHOVNOGO SUDA SSSR No. 6, 40.
22. Id. § 4.
23. Id. § 6.
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for a term not exceeding three years.3 4 With the exception of employ-
ment agreements in particular sectors of the economy in which legisla-
tion requires the parties to enter a contract of three years duration,2 6
Soviet authorities frown upon long term labor contracts.26 Some enter-
prise directors have abused the three year contract, using it to deprive
workers of rights to pay raises, professional training and vacations to
which employees would have been entitled under a contract which
lasted for an indefinite period.2 Although the Principles of Labor Leg-
islation allow the parties to agree to the duration of the contract, some
Soviet commentators believe that such agreements should generally be
restricted to those sectors of the economy for which there is special
legislation."8
The most important economic sectors in which legislation re-
quires a definite term contract are in the employment of "young spe-
cialists" who have received advanced education at the expense of the
state" and in the recruitment of workers for employment in the "Far
North.""0 Under existing legislation, a student who completes a course
of study in higher or middle special education is obligated to work at
24. Principles of Labor Legislation, supra note 10, § 10.
25. A contract for work in the "Far East," i.e., outer Siberia, may not be of less
than two years duration. A person contracting to work at enterprises and construction
sites in Northern Siberia must agree to stay on the job for three years. "Individuals
transferred, called up or directed to work in the Far North and adjacent areas receive a
variety of supplementary benefits as a condition of entering the contract of labor for
three years and for working on islands in the North Polar Ocean for two years." Tu. N.
KORSHUNOV, supra note 19, at 8.
26. Id. It is also noted that: "Formation of a contract for a specified period leads
to a variety of unprofitable consequences for the worker in comparison to a contract for
an undefined period." Id.
27. Gal'tsov, Ukreplenie Predpriiatii-Vazhnyi Faktor Snizheniia Tekuchesti
Kadrov, 1977 SOTSIALISTICHESKII TRUD No. 1, 39.
28. See, e.g., A.I. PROTSEVSKI, METOD PtAvoGo RRGULIROVANIIA TRUDOVYKH
OTNOSHENn 165 (1972). Protsevskii states that:
Formation of a contract for a definite period is permitted in
cases provided for in various normative acts, e.g. with tempo-
rary, seasonal workers, in organized recruitment, etc. In this
manner the legislator has moved along the route of establish-
ing the types of work, the categories of workers with which it
is possible to enter a contract for a definite period.
Id. "In practice, formation of a labor contract for a defined period for the performance of
work which is by its nature of indeterminate duration is permitted only in cases specified
by law . ... " Tu. N. KORSHUNOV, supra note 19, at 8.
29. See Polozhenie o Personal'nom Raspredelenii, supra note 8, and accompany-
ing text.
30. Instruktsiia o Poriadke Predoetavleniia L'got, Kommitet Soveta Ministrov
SSSR po Voprosam Trudi, Dec. 16, 1967, SBORNIK ZAKONODATEL'NYKH AKTOV o TRUDE
900 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Instructions of December 16, 1967].
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an assigned job for not less than three years.31 The personnel commit-
tee of the educational institution has full power, in consultation with
the relevant governmental ministries, to decide "all questions arising in
the process of allocating young specialists. '32 A student who disregards
his work assignment and assumes other employment is discharged
when the infraction is discovered by the appropriate ministry, and the
director of the enterprise at which he has illegally taken work enters
into his labor book the inscription: "Dismissed in connection with vio-
lation of the established rules on employment of young specialists."3
Such an inscription can be a great hindrance to the student's subse-
quent career inasmuch as he must produce the labor book for inspec-
tion by all prospective employers." In certain cases the young special-
ist who assumes employment with the enterprise to which he has been
assigned may resign before the expiration of his three year term."
Legislation requires the use of employment contracts of extended
duration for work in the Far North because of the hardship of living in
that remote and inhospitable region and because of the financial bene-
fits that workers receive to compensate for these hardships. The rele-
vant legislation is designed to avoid a situation in which a worker or
engineer, after receiving extensive training for his new job and relocat-
ing his family to the Far North, both accomplished at the expense of
the enterprise at which he plans to work, decides after a brief period in
the region to return to warmer climes. Legislation requires workers
who prematurely terminate such contracts to return their bonus in an
amount proportional to the time remaining before expiration of the
contract.86 Moreover, an employee who resigns his position in the Far
31. E. VOILENKO & IU. ORLOVSKII, SPRAVOCHNIK MOLODOGO SPETrSLALISTA 32
(1969) [hereinafter cited as E. VOnXLNKO].
32. Polozhenie o Personal'nom Raspredelenii, supra note 8, § 9.
33. E. VOIENKO, supra note 31, at 31.
34. Iu. N. KORSHUNOV, supra note 19, at 27, wherein it is stated that: "Admission
to employment without a labor book is not permitted." Id. The importance of the labor
book is that:
The labor book is the basic document of labor activity of
workers and professionals. On the basis of entries in the labor
book the general, uninterrupted and special periods of labor
are established which are necessary for determining the
amount of sick pay for temporary incapacity, payment of com-
pensation for meritorious service, awarding benefits to individ-
uals who work in the Far North, and for awarding government
pensions.
Id.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 41-43.
36. Instructions of December 16, 1967, supra note 30, § 16.
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North is required to reimburse his employer for the expense of relocat-
ing his family to the region."7
D. Justifiable Termination of a Contract For Defined Period
The Principles of Labor Legislation do, however, allow an em-
ployee who is a party to an employment contract extending for a de-
fined period to resign in certain cases. Section 16(2) provides:
An employment contract for a term may be ter-
minated prematurely at the request of a worker in
the event of illness or disability, preventing per-
formance of the work according to contract, for
breach by the director of the legislation on labor,
the collective or labor contract or for other re-
spectable reasons.3 "
Other "respectable reasons" for premature termination of the
contract include "personal, family, or social-productive circum-
stances."3 9 The worker is generally entitled to resign if he has only one
surviving parent, living in a distant city, who becomes seriously ill or if
he or she marries someone who lives in a different region.4 Young spe-
cialists and workers in the Far North, in addition to other workers who
have contracts for a defined period, are entitled to avail themselves of
these justifications for resignation."' Young specialists, who may resign
only with the permission of the governmental ministry, are recom-
mended for resignation in appropriate cases by the manager of their
enterprise.'" If the young specialist has a "respectable reason" for leav-
ing work and the manager refuses to recommend his resignation, the
Factory Committee of the trade union may recommend his resignation
to the ministry."3
37. Gintsburg, Srochnyi Trudovyi Dogovor, 1973 SOTSIALISTICHESKII TRUD No. 2,
137.
38. Principles of Labor Legislation, supra note 10, § 16(2).
39. A.S. PASHKOV, supra note 13, at 227.
40. E. VOILENKO, supra note 31, at 56. Anecdotal evidence gathered by the au-
thor suggests that young specialists, upon completion of their education, often seek a
spouse who resides in a warm region of the country.
41. A.S. PASHKOV, supra note 13, at 227; Iu. N. KORSHUNOV, supra note 19, at 60.
42. E. VOnENKO, supra note 31, at 56.
43. Id. at 57. Korshunov points out that: "Final assessment of the justifiable na-
ture of the reasons leading to premature termination of the labor contract is the preroga-
tive of the organs which adjudicate labor disputes," the factory committee of the trade
union and the courts. Iu. N. KORSHUNOV, supra note 19, at 60. He also states:
In many enterprises the administrators, officials in the person-
nel office or members of the factory committee of the trade
union uncover the reasons leading the worker to request ter-
19821
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Cases arise, moreover, in which the manager does not object to
premature termination of the contract even though the worker cannot
rely on one of the enumerated justifications for resignation. In these
situations the Principles of Labor Legislation allow the parties to ter-
minate the contract by agreement." The manager may permit the em-
ployee to resign in order to assume employment at another enterprise
which is better suited to the skills or domicile of the worker or in order
to permit the employee to learn a new specialty. Some enterprises now
draft employment contracts which allow the worker to change jobs
within the enterprise or to transfer to a different factory after six or
twelve months." A worker may transfer to a different enterprise,
subordinate to the same governmental ministry as his own factory, by
securing the permission of the ministry.4" He may also transfer to a
different enterprise subordinate to the same ministry if the managers
of the two firms concur.' 7
E. Penalties For Unjustified Termination
An employee who terminates a labor contract extending for a de-
fined period without the permission of the manager or without a "re-
spectable reason" is subject to certain penalties. "The unjustified resig-
nation of a worker or professional is analyzed as the crudest type of
breach of loyalty in the area of labor relations."" Unjustified resigna-
tion may be treated as absence from work without excuse, and a corre-
sponding notation may be made in the worker's labor book.' 9 Salary
and benefits may be withheld, and the worker may forfeit compensa-
tory payments which he received in connection with relocation."0
II. FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AS A CONTROL ON LABOR MOBILITY
As employment contracts for a definite duration play a significant
role only in narrowly defined sectors of the Soviet economy such as the
employment of young specialists and workers in the Far North, the
mination and adopt measures aimed at removing those causes.
Such work assists in preserving a stable work force. However,
such measures may not take the form of coercion upon the
worker and limitation of his right to quit at his own request.
Id.
44. Principles of Labor Legislation, supra note 10, § 15(1).
45. A.S. PASHKOV, supra note 13, at 95.
46. E. N. BOROVSKAIA, PERwVOD NA DRUGUiU RASuTu 33 (1963).
47. Id. at 34.
48. A.S. PASHKOV, supra note 13, at 209.
49. Iu. N. KORSHUNOV, supra note 19, at 27 & 105.
50. A.S. PAsHKov, supra note 13, at 228.
[Vol. 3
LABOR MOBILITY
penalties for unjustified, premature termination of such agreements are
not the government's primary control on the mobility of labor. The
government prefers to promote stability of the labor force through eco-
nomic incentives rather than legal sanctions.5" The use of incentives in
labor relations accords with the government's policy of financial re-
wards in other areas of the planned economy, such as bonuses for en-
terprise managers whose firms exceed their production plans, supple-
mentary vacations for exemplary workers, cultural, social and
educational preferences for the personnel of highly productive firms."
The widespread use of material incentives to encourage performance of
the National Economic Plan began in earnest in 1965, when the gov-
ernment expressly adopted the policy of linking self-interest of individ-
uals to the national interest in industrial productivity."3
The most significant forms of financial incentives that the govern-
ment has designed to promote labor stability are: 1) bonuses for con-
tinuous employment in the economy as a whole, either at one firm or in
a combination of jobs; 2) rewards for continuous service in a special-
ized capacity; and 3) bonuses for seniority within a single firm.
A. Incentives For Uninterrupted Employment
Many benefits which a Soviet worker receives depend upon the
length of his uninterrupted employment either at one firm or in a com-
bination of jobs (nepreryvnyi stazh). These benefits include the
amount of compensation for temporary incapacity, bonuses, retirement
pensions and a special addition of ten percent to the pension if an em-
51. KOMMENTARII K POLOZHENIIU O SOTSIALISTICHESKOM GOSUDARSTVENNOM
PREDPRIIATII 7 (V. Laptev ed. 1971). "Economic methods of guidance are more flexible
and effective [than criminal or administrative sanctions] for they influence the behavior
of people through their interests, create the conditions through which the enterprise
profitably operates well and unprofitably operates poorly." Id.
52. Polozhenie o Poriadke Raspredeleniia Pribyli (Planovoi i Sverkhplanovoi)
Promyshlennykh Predpriiatii, Peredannykh na Novuiu Sistemu Planirovaniia i Eko-
nomicheskogo Stimulirovaniia, Utverzhdeno Ministerstvom Finansov SSSR, Gosplanom
SSSR i Gosbankom SSSR, Apr. 12, 1967, 1967 EKONOMIKA 127, § 10.
53. See V. LAPrEv, KHOZIMSTVENNOE PAwo 114 (1967); G. Armstrong, The Right
to Control Property and the Construction of Communism: Property in the U.S.S.R. 282-
93 (1982) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in Princeton University Library). The corner-
stone of the reforms of 1965 was the Statute on the Socialist State Production Enter-
prise, 1965 SP SSSR Nos. 19-20, st. 155. The statute gave managers much broader rights
to dispose of the assets of their enterprises and expanded the terms on which managers
could negotiate contracts for the goods which their firms produced. Reforms commencing
in 1965 also provided for material incentive funds for workers at firms which fulfilled or
over-fulfilled their production plans.
1982]
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ployee has fifteen years of uninterrupted service."'
A worker who resigns from an employment contract of definite
duration for justifiable reasons or who exercises his option to terminate
a contract of indefinite duration does not automatically lose his period
of uninterrupted work. If he assumes a position at another firm within
a month of his resignation, he is entitled to transfer his period of unin-
terrupted service to the second enterprise.5 5 The government's objec-
tive in adopting the incentives for continuous employment was to en-
courage workers, who lawfully leave one job, to re-enter the work force
quickly.
A worker who leaves employment because of sickness or tempo-
rary incapacity retains his uninterrupted period of service regardless of
the length of his incapacity.56 Moreover, if the employee agrees to a
transfer to another enterprise at the request of the factory manager, he
also retains his uninterrupted period of service. Regulations governing
labor in the Far North, for example, provide:
In the transfer of a worker from one enterprise
(establishment, organization) to another, accord-
ing to a directive of a superior organ (in relation
to the subordinate enterprise, establishment, or-
ganization) or by agreement between the manage-
ment of the enterprises, establishments, organiza-
tions and also by directives of Soviet, Party, trade
union, and Komsomol organizations, the effective-
ness of the employment contract, entered for a
definite period, does not terminate. 7
B. Incentives For Service in a Specialty
Some economic enterprises also provide bonuses and benefits that
are calculated on the length of time an employee has worked in his
specialty. Special legislation, for example, governs the benefits of ma-
chinists who work in the timber industry. 8 A machinist who leaves his
employment in the timber industry loses his term of prior work in the
54. N. Gudimov, L'goty Rabochim i Sluzhashchim za Nepreryvnyi Stazh Raboty,
1968 SOVETSKAIA IUSTITSIIA No. 5, 10.
55. Ukazanie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, Jan. 25, 1960, 1960 VwoMosTI
VEBKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR No. 4, st. 36.
56. A.S. PASHKOV, supra note 13, at 226.
57. Instructions of December 16, 1967, supra note 30, § 11.
58. Polozhenie Gosudarstvennogo Kommiteta po Voprosam Truda, Nov. 13,
1969, 1970 BIULLETEN' GOSKOMTRUDA No. 2, 577.
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specialty, even though he later returns to that profession."' Return to
work in the timber industry after a period of military service, illness,
arrest for a petty crime or the birth of a child are exceptions to this
general rule.10 If the ministry transfers a machinist to another organi-
zation at which he continues to work in his specialty, the bonuses to
which he is entitled are paid proportionately by each firm."'
C. Incentives For Prolonged Service in One Enterprise
Finally, certain organizations pay special bonuses for prolonged,
meritorious service (vyslugu let) in one firm. Legislation adopted in
1957 allows bonuses on the basis of seniority commencing after two
years in the case of miners and after three years for all other employ-
ees.6 2 The use of such incentives has intensified since 1965.6 3 According
to one Soviet author, "now every enterprise, in accordance with its eco-
nomic capacity and local conditions, is required to give benefits and
advantages to workers and professionals who for a lengthy time work
in that enterprise." The following chart illustrates timber industry
bonuses calculated as a percentage of annual pay."5
Seniority Managers and Specialists Other Workers
3-5 years 15% 10%
5-10 years 20% 15%
10-15 years 25% 20%
More than 15 years 30% 20%
The bonus for prolonged meritorious service is a lump sum payment
made upon retirement or resignation from the job.
In attempting to control the movement of labor, the Soviets have
adopted a three-tier system of financial incentives. Of these three
forms of financial incentives, only those rewards based on continuous
service to the economy as a whole offer tangible benefits to the young
worker who is least likely to have family financial responsibilities but
who is most likely to change jobs frequently. These incentives are the
most significant, for incentives based on the length of uninterrupted
work are not designed to retain an employee in a particular job but
59. Id. § 5.
60. Id. § 6.
61. Id.
62. 1957 SP SSSR No. 4, st. 43.
63. See supra note 53.
64. Gudimov, supra note 54.
65. 0 Poriadke Vyplaty Voznagrazhdeniia za Vysluga Let, SBORNIK ZAKONO-
DATEL'NYKH AKTOV o TRUDE 546 (1974).
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rather are designed to keep him in the work force at large. The second
class of financial incentives, bonuses for duration of work in a spe-
cialty, are designed to retain skilled workers in the profession for which
they have been trained and to avoid the costs of training new workers.
Finally, the third class of incentives, bonuses for prolonged service in
one firm, are designed to encourage employees to remain at particular
factories, to reduce the costs to the enterprise of recruiting workers
and to enhance employees' loyalty to the firm."
III. THE RIGHT TO RETAIN A JOB
The converse of the worker's right to change jobs at will is his
right to retain his present job when the manager, or the ministry,
wishes to transfer him. The U.S.S.R. Principles of Labor Legislation
and the R.S.F.S.R. Labor Code"" permit the factory manager to trans-
fer a worker permanently to another job only with the employee's con-
sent." Management may temporarily reassign a worker in the event of
an industrial emergency,19 idleness of the facility at which the worker
66. Soviet experts disagree on the effectiveness of these incentives. See infra text
accompanying notes 102-18.
67. The Labor Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Dec. 9,
1971 [hereinafter cited as R.S.F.S.R. Labor Code].
68. Section 25 of the R.S.F.S.R. Labor Code provides:
Transfer to other work at the same enterprise, institution, or-
ganization, and also transfer to work at another enterprise, in-
stitution, organization or to a different locale, except together
with the enterprise, institute, organization, is permitted only
with agreement of the worker or professional with the excep-
tion of cases provided in [sections] 26, 27 and 135 of this
Code.
Relocation of the worker or professional to a different
work place within the same enterprise, institute, organization
without change of specialty, qualification, responsibility,
amount of wage, benefits, advantages and other essential con-
ditions of labor is not considered transfer to different work.
R.S.F.S.R. Labor Code, supra note 67, § 25.
69. Section 26 of the R.S.F.S.R. Labor Code provides:
In case of production necessity for the enterprise, institution,
organization, the manager has the right to transfer workers
and professionals for a period up to one month to work not
specified in the employment contract at the same enterprise,
institute, organization or to a different enterprise, organiza-
tion, institution but in the same locale at a wage no lower than
the average rate of pay for the previous work. Such transfer is
allowed for combatting or liquidating natural disaster, a pro-
duction accident or for rapid correction of their consequences;
for overcoming unfortunate accidents, idleness, destruction or
[Vol. 3
LABOR MOBILITY
is presently employed7 0 or as a disciplinary measure.
7 1
A. Permanent Reassignment
In order to determine what constitutes "transfer to different
work," section 25 of the R.S.F.S.R. Labor Code must be read in con-
junction with section 12 of the U.S.S.R. Principles of Labor Legisla-
tion. Section 12 provides that "[t]he management does not have the
right to demand from the worker or professional the performance of
work not provided for in the labor contract." 2 Moreover, section 8 of
the Principles of Labor Legislation states that the labor contract "obli-
gates the worker to perform work in a defined specialty, qualification
or responsibility.17  Although many terms in a Soviet labor contract
are established by the central government, including length of work-
spoilage of state or social property and in other extraordinary
cases and also for replacing absent workers or professionals.
The duration of the transfer to other work for replace-
ment of an absent worker may not exceed one month in a cal-
endar year.
Id. §26.
70. Section 27 of the R.S.F.S.R. Labor Code provides:
In case of idleness, workers and professionals are transferred
in consideration of their specialty and qualification to differ-
ent work at the same enterprise, institution, organization for
the entire period of idleness, or to another enterprise, institu-
tion, organization in the .same locale for a period of up to one
month.
In a transfer to lower paying work as a consequence of
idleness, the average rate of pay at the previous job is retained
for the workers and professionals fulfilling output norms; but
for workers and professionals not fulfilling norms or trans-
ferred to work paying an hourly wage, their rate of wages (ba-
sic pay) is retained.
Id. §27.
71. Section 135 of the R.S.F.S.R. Labor Code provides:
For the violation of labor discipline, the administration of an





(4) transfer to lower paying work for a term of
up to three months, or removal to a lower po-
sition for the same term;
(5) dismissal.
Id. § 135.
72. Principles of Labor Legislation, supra note 10, § 12.
73. Id. § 8.
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day, 4 safety standards' 6 and funds for payment,7 s "some of the condi-
tions of work are regulated by the contract."' "7 Pashkov finds that the
specialty and qualifications of the job are terms which are particularly
appropriate for negotiation.7 8 The R.S.F.S.R. Labor Code is designed
"to orient the management of the factory to include labor functions in
the contract . .. corresponding to the professional interests of the
worker, to his personal inclination. '' 79 If the contract defines the
worker's position with specificity, he is protected from the threat of
involuntary transfer. "Any change in the character and terms of work
established in the labor contract may be analyzed as a transfer to other
work." 80
Commentators, statutes and cases provide examples of transfer to
different work. Pashkov notes that the R.S.F.S.R. Labor Code permits
the manager to move a worker within the enterprise if his specialty,
qualifications and responsibility are not changed.8" A transfer consists
of "such changes as touch the character of the work itself and the con-
ditions of its fulfillment."' If the contract requires the worker to work
for one store, shop or geological expedition which is not itself a juridi-
cal person, transfer to another place of employment performing pre-
cisely the same task for an entity which is owned by the same juridical
person is, nonetheless, transfer to different work.8" A 1975 U.S.S.R. Su-
preme Court case involved a physics teacher in the town of Erevan who
was ordered to transfer to a different school in the same town.84 The
Armenian Supreme Court dismissed the teacher's suit, noting that he
would have the same responsibilities and salary and that both schools
were operated by the same legal entity.88 Upon appeal instituted by
the Deputy Procurator General of the U.S.S.R., the High Court of the
Union reversed the Armenian Supreme Court. The teacher had entered
a contract to work at a particular school, observed the Court, and his
transfer constituted movement to a new organization. 6
The R.S.F.S.R. Supreme Court has held that a worker who is
74. R.S.F.S.R. Labor Code, supra note 67, §§ 41-56.
75. Id. §§ 139-159,
76. Id. §§ 77-101.
77. A.S. PASHKOV, supra note 13, at 181-82.
78. Id. at 85.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 195.
81. Id. at 196.
82. Id. at 198.
83. R.S.F.S.R. Labor Code, supra note 67, § 25.





transferred without his consent may immediately terminate the con-
tract. 8 7 Moreover, he may accept the transfer without being deemed to
have acquiesced- if he simultaneously appeals to the courts.88 If a
worker under special contract to work in the Far North refuses to
transfer to other work, the enterprise must pay the expenses of the
worker and his family connected with relocation to his previous posi-
tion.89 In addition, any employee who consents to transfer to a lower
paying job in the same factory retains his previous grade of pay for two
weeks.90
Ordinarily an employee may be transferred with his consent.
However, young specialists who have received advanced training in a
particular academic discipline or field of engineering "cannot be trans-
ferred to different work not in their specialty even if they consent."91
Any such transfer must be approved by the governmental ministry su-
pervising the firm.
B. Temporary Reassignment
In contrast to the R.S.F.S.R. Labor Code's restrictions on invol-
untary permanent transfers of employees, legislation does allow tempo-
rary transfer in extraordinary situations on account of production
emergencies,"' idleness of the facility at which they are employed'" or
as a disciplinary measure." Soviet scholars do not report satisfactory
results from extraordinary transfers of workers. Ivanov notes that
"transfer in connection with production necessity is not satisfactory to
the worker insofar as he is often compelled to perform different work
than that to which he had become accustomed." 5 The process "yields
unprofitable results for the enterprise as the worker is not used accord-
ing to his skills and is paid at his own wage rate irrespective of the
results of his labor.""
A worker who refuses to change jobs temporarily because of pro-
duction necessity "is considered to be in violation of labor discipline.'
7
The enterprise will countenance certain excuses such as physical inca-
87. 1957 SOVETSKAIA IUSTITSIIA No. 4, 77.
88. E.N. BOROVSKAIA, supra note 46, at 8.
89. Instructions of December 16, 1967, supra note 30, § 18(b).
90. A.S. PASHKOV, supra note 13, at 204.
91. E. VOILENKO, supra note 31, at 36.
92. See supra note 69.
93. See supra note 70.
94. See supra note 71.
95. S.A. IVANOV, supra note 16, at 136.
96. Id.
97. A.S. PASHKOV, supra note 13, at 207.
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pacity, lack of necessary skills or medical excuses."s A recent R.S.F.S.R.
Supreme Court case considered a worker's refusal to submit to tempo-
rary reassignment." S., a laboratory employee, was transferred to work
in an assembly line for one month because of production necessity.
When he refused the assignment, the manager gave S. a "strict scold-
ing." S. sued in court claiming that this disciplinary measure was un-
justified. The Supreme Court was satisfied that a production necessity
had existed and that installation of new technology in the factory justi-
fied transferring forty-two workers to the assembly line. The Court ob-
served that rule 11 of the "Model Rules of Internal Labor Direction"10 0
requires workers to follow promptly the directives of the manager, and
that section 135 of the R.S.F.S.R. Labor Code allows disciplinary mea-
sures. Thus the trial court properly refused the worker's appeal.10 1
IV. CRITICISM AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The worker's right to work at the enterprise of his choice entails
both the right to resign and the right to remain in a position despite
attempts by management to transfer him. Although some commenta-
tors suggest that the temporary reassignment of workers on account of
production emergencies is an inefficient use of skilled labor,103 Soviet
literature contains no recent proposals for reform in this area. On the
other hand, a variety of solutions are proposed by Soviet commentators
to the problem of excessive labor mobility. Most commentators prefer
economic inducements to labor stability rather than prohibition of
movement or the creation of administrative obstacles.
Pashkov notes that if "the principle of freedom of labor law con-
tract is not to be onesided . . . the right of the worker to select his
place of work and labor function must correspond to the right of the
98. Id.
99. 1979 BIULLETEN' VFRKHOVNOGO SUDA RSFSR No. 10, 1.
100. Id. The Model Rules of Internal Labor Direction for Workers and Employ-
ees of Enterprises, Establishments and Organizations, Postanovienie Gosudarstvennogo
Komiteta Soveta Ministrov SSSR po voprosam truda i zarabotnoi platy, SBORNIK ZAKO-
NODATEL'NYKH AKTOV o TRUDE 497 (1977), provide that:
Section 11: Workers and employees are obligated to
b) observe labor discipline, the basis of order in
production (timely arrival at work, observance of
the duration of the work day, using all work time
for productive labor, prompt and precise per-
formance of directives of management, etc.).
Id.
101. Id.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
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enterprise to choose the most skilled, best workers."' 03 He and other
commentators who hold this view object that hindrances to workers'
resignations, such as requiring the trade union to approve all resigna-
tions, "contradict the principle of free choice of work place."
104
Prior to the economic reforms of 1965 and the intensified use of
material incentives, one Soviet scholar suggested that a worker who re-
signs an indefinite term employment contract without justification
should be deprived of accrued benefits arising from his period of unin-
terrupted employment even if he resumed work within a month and
should be deprived of his right to a pension, in the event of temporary
disability, for six months.105 The editors of the journal in which the
article appeared agreed that "we should not preserve the uninter-
rupted period of work for those employees who resign at their own re-
quest without justification."' "
Subsequent legislation did not adopt these proposals, and since
1965 commentators have argued that reform should remove the causes
of workers' dissatisfaction with their present jobs rather than chilling
the exercise of their right to seek other employment. "It is essential to
find a more rational solution, answering the spirit of our time and cur-
rent tendencies in the development of labor legislation. It is necessary
to resolve the reasons giving rise to resignation at the request of the
worker." 107
The cause of excessive mobility in the work force has been the
subject of lively debate in the Soviet press in recent years. Some schol-
ars believe that workers have insufficient financial incentive to remain
in an employment position.0" Other authors suggest that managers
might diminish the turnover of their work force by adopting a more
solicitous attitude to the problems of their employees. 1"9 A third group
of commentators note that workers often change jobs because they ini-
tially enter their employment without giving sufficient consideration to
their career objectives.110 Protsevskii, for example, believes that the so-
lution to labor mobility is "in establishing benefits and advantages in
the area of pay, vacation time for those who work freely and for a long
period and unprofitable consequences for those who frequently move
103. A.S. PASHKOV, supra note 13, at 139.
104. Id. See Pravovye Voprosy Bor'by s Tekuchest'iu Kadrov, 1964 SovErsKuA
IUSTTSIIA No. 1, 12 [hereinafter cited as Pravovye Voprosy].
105. Pravovye Voprosy, supra note 104, at 12.
106. 1d.
107. Id.
108. See infra text accompanying note 111.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 114-15.
110. See infra text accompanying note 119.
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from one enterprise to another."1"' Although Protsevskii believes that
"the unjustified movement of personnel objectively contradicts
planned, proportional development of the economy,"' 12 he argues that
adopting laws which prohibit the movement of workers would be "arti-
ficial" in an era of rapid technical progress. 1 3 Ivanov concurs, stating
that: "To fight the mobility of labor it is necessary, obviously, not to
make it more difficult to leave a job, but to remove the reasons which
give rise to the request to resign." "" Gudimov notes that one factory in
Krasnodar has an unusually high turnover rate. "One of the reasons for
this is that the factory management and the factory committee did not
provide in the collective contract for awarding benefits and advantages
to production leaders, and workers for long periods." '
Another author believes that enterprises should actually compete
with one another to attract workers. "Competition among enterprises
should be as unceasing as worker movement itself is. There is no limit
to the material and cultural improvements that can be made in work-
ers' lives. The constant 'differences in potential' among enterprises
benefit both production and workers." ' Such competition may, of
course, increase labor mobility. "Attempts at retaining personnel
through creation of advantages in pay have had no influence on reduc-
ing mobility and in a variety of cases have actually brought about its
increase.1 1 7 One manager relates that two plants in his region have
been competing for years for the best workers. "One day a director
builds a swimming pool and young workers whose occupations are in
short supply flock to him; the next day another director institutes free
lunches and the move is on to his plant." '
Finally, some commentators maintain that a primary cause of la-
bor mobility is absence of adequate information about the skills which
a position will require and the training which employment in a factory
will offer. Ivanov believes that a significant percentage of workers
change jobs because of dissatisfaction with the position as a work expe-
rience.19 The towns of Ufa and Kaluka tried to remedy this problem
by requiring all local factories to hire workers through a central office
111. A.I. PROTSEVSKII, supra note 28.
112. Id. at 183.
113. Id. at 186.
114. S.A. IVANOV, supra note 16, at 157-58.
115. Gudimov, supra note 54, at 10.
116. Kuznetsov, Turnover or Mobility, 31 CuRRENT DIG. OF SOVIET PREsS No. 29,
16 (1979).
117. Gal'tsov, supra note 27, at 32.
118. Kuznetsov, supra note 116.
119. S.A. IVANOV, supra note 16, at 120.
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in the town, rather than on site, and to provide information in the of-
fice that would allow applicants to compare potential employers. In
Ufa the movement of production workers declined from 18.1% in 1970
to 16.5% in 1971. In the construction industry movement fell from
19.6% to 19.3%. In the town of Kaluka mobility declined from 17% to
14.8%. 20 Little additional information about this experiment is availa-
ble, and there are no reports of other towns adopting its design.
CONCLUSION
In contrast to all other resources which Soviet industrial enter-
prises require for production, labor is not allocated to socialist firms by
the Plan.121 The average Soviet worker has substantial freedom to
choose the career that he will pursue, limited by his attainment of edu-
cation and practical skills and by the availability of employment posi-
tions, and to select the enterprise at which he wishes to work. Soviet
authors note that labor resources are distinguished from other compo-
nents of production such as raw materials, capital, transport and fuel
because of the traditional concern of Marxist ideology for such human-
istic values as the complete development of each person's talents,",2
the individual's right to choose the capacities that he will develop,
12
and a working environment in which the worker finds fulfillment
rather than alienation.
12 4
The actual reason for distinguishing labor from other components
of production that are subject to national planning is probably practi-
cal rather than humanistic. The Soviet press often expresses criticism
of substandard production of goods and the failure of firms to perform
tasks assigned by the Plan.125 The press attributes many of these
problems to inadequate "labor discipline," poor morale and insufficient
concern by directors for labor-management relations.2 6 Assigning
workers to employment in firms through the economic planning mech-
120. Id.
121. See supra note 7.
122. Gal'tsov emphasizes the necessity of providing workers with opportunities
to use skills which they already possess and to develop new talents. See supra note 27, at
33.
123. A.I. PROTSEVSKII, supra note 28, at 186.
124. Moral'nyi Klimat Kollektiva, Pravda, Oct. 27, 1982, 1. Lenin also wrote
that increasing national economic efficiency and removal of the alienating aspects of in-
dustrial labor were inextricably related tasks. V.I. Lenin, State and Revolution in THE
LENIN ANTHOLOGY 379 (R.C. Tucker ed. 1975).
125. Three recent examples of criticism of industrial production are Neotlozhnye
Zaboty Stroitelei, Pravda, Oct. 22, 1982, 1; Metall po Zakazam, Pravda, Oct. 14, 1982, 1;
Ukrepleniaia Sodruzhestvo Smezhnikov, Pravda, Oct. 8, 1982, 1.
126. Norma Truda, Pravda, Nov. 1, 1982, 1.
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anism would augment labor's discontent and further aggravate
problems of production. Accordingly, the government attempts to in-
crease the commitment of labor to productivity by permitting free
choice of place of employment.
Soviet commentators have urged management to reduce the
causes of labor turnover rather than hinder mobility. The discussion
above demonstrates that the years since 1965 have been a period of
experimentation with various methods of attracting and retaining
workers. 27 In addition to bonuses for seniority and penalties for pro-
longed unemployment, the government encourages managers to offer
fringe benefits and economic incentives for high productivity. Although
the recent transition in Soviet leadership aggravates the difficulties in
prediction of future policy, the government will probably continue to
experiment with various forms of material incentives as a means of en-
hancing the commitment of the labor force to production and to their
firms.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 107-20.
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